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dakotamurray.bsky.social · @dakotamurray.bsky.social@bridge.neodb.net

Rated The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science 8/10

The best thing about the book is the summing up of the major Popper vs. Kuhn debate of the 20th century over the "method" of science. This is done in an engaging and clear way, and for that reason alone I would recommend it to any practicing scientist who wants to understand a bit more about epistemology and sociology of science. <br/><br/>I don't like Strevens' treatment of those who came after Popper&Kuhn, however. Scholars as diverse as Paul Feyerabend, Bruno Latour, and Harry Collins, are summed under a broad banner of social epistemologists and presented as a foil against Popper&Kuhn. Strevens tacitly endorses the view of this group about the essential subjectivity of science, yet I feel doesn't do their arguments justice or represent them as equals in the wider methods debate. <br/><br/>Finally, Strevens outlines his own idea of a scientific method, based around an "iron rule" of scientific communication demanding arguments-by-evidence, at least in public forums, and a sort of natural consensus-making among scientists that directs them towards conducting more tests and crafting and accepting theories with more explanatory power. I'm unsure how much I agree with this as a universal method of science; it leaves lots of things out; are non-empirical theorists and mathematicians, not scientists? Are lawyers who employ similar strategies in court scientists? Would conspiracy theorists, who often attempt a kind of "iron rule" in their arguments also qualify as scientists too? His argument makes sense, yet although I have some experience with the history of science & epistemology, I don't have enough to take a side on whether Strevens' version of the scientific method holds water. <br/><br/>Most of his arguments are supported with historical examples of episodes in science, with a particular interest in the the observations of solar eclipses by Edington necessary for testing Einstein's theories, and the fuzziness and messiness of the data involved. There are also some interesting parts about Louis Pasteur and Charles Darwin. At times, however, Strevens' uses metaphors when he should default to simpler terms or more historical examples; for example, he for some reason refers to the Popperian & Kuhnian camps as "Monegues" and "Capulets", which while cute, forces the reader to keep track of another set of names, and the metaphor itself contributes little. <br/><br/>Overall, a decent book. I have personal issues with the argument, but that's fine. I think the intended audience is practicing scientists with less interest in deep epistemological arguments; for those readers, I readily recommend it, and it will certainly teach them something about science. For anyone with more than passing interest in the debates over the philosophy of science, much of the book will only serve as a refresher, and the description of the "Iron Rule" framework will likely feel too vague to really evaluate; I am sure that Strevens' academic works develop the argument more fully. Give it a read if you're interested!<br/>

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Published 2026-08-18 16:11 UTC · bridged from Atmosphere